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INTRODUCTION
Kazakhs lived at the socio-political frontier of the Rus-
sian Empire and maintained a nomadic existence accord-
ing to four seasons of the harsh Eurasian continental steppe
climate. The traditional Kazakhs moved at least four times
in a year to ‘auls’ (villages) rotating to different areas—
Kokteu, Zhailau, Kuzdeu, and Kystau—i.e., spring, sum-
mer, autumn, and winter pastures. This traditional no-
madic practice existed for hundreds, if not thousands, of
years in the steppes of Eurasia, whose environmentally
sustainable husbandry and pastoralism protected the ex-
istence of several generations of Kazakh tribes without
major ethnocide-level food crises.
Kazakhs are of Turkic descent speaking Kazakh language
and practising a historic mix of traditional Sufi Islam and
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Abstrak
Artikel ini membahas kasus kelaparan bersejarah di Kazakhstan tahun 1931-1933 untuk menggambarkan bahwa ‘kelaparan’ atau ‘krisis
pangan’ terjadi utamanya karena ‘pengabaian berpengetahuan’ oleh sistem pemerintahan Soviet dalam upayanya mengejar prioritas
perkembangan modern. Tulisan ini mengeksplorasi konsep ‘kelaparan’ melalui Malthusianisme, ‘pendekatan hak,’ dan konsep ‘kelaparan
baru.’ Kasus ini menunjukkan bahwa kebijakan politik pemerintah Soviet memperburuk kondisi masyarakat pinggiran dan terpinggirkan
untuk mencapai prioritas ‘kebaikan yang lebih besar’ dari kepentingan nasionalnya, terutama industrialisasi dan pembangunan ekonomi
modern. Kasus ini menunjukkan bahwa setiap promosi atas ‘identitas’ dominan, khususnya dalam bentuk pembangunan modern dianggap
lebih ‘beradab’ sehingga secara tidak langsung memiliki kecenderungan terhadap pengucilan dan penindasan kehidupan tradisional masyarakat
pinggiran. Secara keseluruhan, artikel ini secara kritis mengeksplorasi ‘kelaparan’ sebagai masalah biopolitik kompleks dari tindakan publik
maupun ketidakadaan tindakan, kegagalan akuntabilitas yang memunculkan ‘pengabaian yang berpengetahuan.’
Kata kunci: kelaparan, ketahanan pangan, biopolitik, konstruksi tentang dunia ketiga, modernisasi, industrialisasi Soviet.
Abstract
This article examines and problematizes the historical case of famine in Kazakhstan between 1931-1933 to illustrate that ‘starvation,’
‘famine,’ or ‘food crisis’ occurred primarily because of ‘knowledgeable neglect’ by the Soviet governance to pursue the priorities of modern
development. This paper explores the concepts of ‘famine’ through Malthusianism, ‘entitlement approach,’ and ‘new famine.’ The case
shows that particular Soviet government policies and political decisions by individual officials worsened the condition of marginalized com-
munities on behalf of the attainment of a ‘greater good’ of the national government priorities. The case demonstrates that any promotion of
a dominant ‘identity’ exposes the inclination towards exclusion and repression of ‘bare life’ of peripheral people. Overall, the article critically
explores the ‘famine’ as a complex biopolitical problem of public action or inaction, failure of accountability, and therefore generating
‘knowledgeable neglect’ of periphery populations.
Keywords: famine, food security, biopolitics, third worldism, modernization, Soviet industrialization.
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more institutionalized mosque-centred Sunni Islam of the
Hanafi madhhab. Because of their nomadic lifestyle in the
climatically harsh steppes of Northern Eurasia, they were
unable to settle into a more institutionalized Islamic tradi-
tions of their southern neighbours such as Uzbeks and
Tajiks, who since 7th century AD were Islamized by Arabs
invading the Ferghana Valley (Mawarannahr) from
Mesopotamia. Proto-Kazakhs had superficial exposure to
Islam and persisted with their traditional beliefs and invo-
cations which combined elements of Tengrism, Shaman-
ism, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism, who combined their
Islamic belief with the nomadic proto-Turko-Mongol or
Hun traditions of the “harmonious unity between humans
and the surrounding world, the blue skies, and endless
steppe, and in particular, the helping power of ancestral
spirits and the cult of saints and batyrs” (Yemelianova, 2014:
287-289).
The migration of settled Muslim Tatars from the city
of Kazan in Russia to the Kazakh steppes started in the
18th century under the policy of the Catherine the Great
(1762-1796) for “legalisation and management of her Mus-
lim subjects.” Russian Imperial biopolitical governmentality
disciplined Kazakhs into ‘civilized’ life with the “persis-
tent erosion of Kazakh nomadism through the official
policy of Kazakh settlement;” however, the lifeworld of
Kazakhs with nomadic Sufi rituals and traditions of the
steppe ended with the Bolshevik Revolution and the es-
tablishment of the Soviet Union (Yemelianova, 2014: 286-
289).
Kazakhs in 1920-1930s were still culturally quite dis-
tinct from the majority Russian ethnics in the west and
north and the settled Uzbeks and Tajiks in the south. In
the late 1920s, only 23 percent of Kazakhs were entirely
sedentary (Pianciola, 2001). As a result of the 1930s col-
lectivization policies for development of Soviet modern
agriculture “approximately 38 percent of the total popula-
tion” deaths in Kazakhstan were “directly attributable to
the famine of 1931-1933” (Pianciola, 2001: 237).
The magnitude of human suffering becomes even more
disturbing as Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan were in-
cluded into grand Soviet industrialization plans for agri-
cultural expansion and modernization of grain cultivation
(Pianciola, 2001). The suffering and death of traditionally
nomadic and Muslim Kazakhs seemed to be necessary for
the successful modernization, social transformation, and
industrial progress of Soviet Union.
Historic changes in the understanding of famine had
shaped current perceptions regarding international aid,
humanitarianism, and government policies. Famine can
be viewed as a consequence of natural disaster, a lack of
food production, a disruption of food supply and distribu-
tion, a man-made economic, political, or even military
instrument. In contrast, the term ‘famine’ as examined in
this article refers not only to a passive state suffered by
unfortunate mass of persons, but also to a condition cre-
ated by an authoritative few either through direct inter-
vention or through neglection. Thus, famine as discussed
in this paper will be broader in scope than the specific
World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) terms of ‘chronic
undernutrition’ or ‘hidden hunger.’ FAO and WHO rec-
ommend the average energy intake for adults of 2,250 calo-
ries a day to sustain light activity. If a person continuously
receives less than that amount of calories (depending on
climate and physical activity) than he/she would go under
the category of ‘chronic undernutrition.’ If a person does
not receive the recommended daily amount of micronu-
trients (vitamins and minerals) with the diet, than he/she
would be categorized under the ‘hidden hunger’ (Paarlberg,
2010).
This paper will show that the widely-held belief in the
beneficence of institutional governance may not be sus-
tainable, even if authorities of globally-capable organiza-
tions accept the validity of Grotian liberal definitions of
‘rights’ (Stumpf, 2006) and ‘justice’ (Guidance Note of
the Secretary General, 2010). Cases of food crises created
and worsened by state lapses continue to occur in contem-
porary society. These may also be linked to the practice of
governments to prioritize their systems over the well-being
and survival of particular, often marginalized peoples that
the systems should serve.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Information from historical materials of the recently-
defunct Eastern Bloc points to several issues on institu-
tionally-induced suffering. First, it allows the problem to
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be located in a context where systems of governance and
management other than those of the United States were
considered troublesome, inferior, and undesirable particu-
larly by American analysts (Robertson, 1980). Second, the
approach allows a thematic exit from the fallacy of compo-
sition that discourse on ‘identity’ seems to imply (Malesevic,
2006); that is, a ‘Soviet’ identity may not necessarily corre-
spond to a totalizing summary of the negative effects that
Soviet governance may have had on its citizens. Third, and
crucially, the belief that the passing of the Soviet Union
allows the populations of the world to identify with the
triumphant, peaceful, and prosperous ‘new world order’
of neoliberalism and free markets (Freedman, 1992) does
not settle the issue that dominant ‘identity,’ particularly
in its modernist form that include ‘civilizing’ function,
reinforces tendencies towards exclusion and repression
(Parfitt, 2002).
This is most clearly seen in the rehabilitation of the
term ‘Third Worldism’ to refer to a form of resistance to
an American led ‘imperialism’ (Patel & McMichael, 2004)
and to a reference to a ‘third world poor’ as ‘homines sacri’
whose economic upliftment is the moral justification of
the ‘democratico-capitalist project’ that has caused a glo-
bal imbalance of wealth (Parfitt, 2009). In fact, the term
‘Third World’ was used originally to refer to a form of
social existence that was in transition, rather than in op-
position to the capitalist and communist blocs, in the
middle of the Cold War (Sauve, 1986). Thus, it is possible
to study the problems associated with famine and knowl-
edgeable neglect in order to identify lessons for the present,
without the need to create solidarity with the past or to
limit the analysis to the perspectives of either the author
or the reader. More positively, broadening the ways in which
famine can be understood will only bring benefits to those
who seek to resolve it regardless of ideological ‘identity’
(Malesevic, 2006) or institutional system it may represent.
In its simplest form, famine is a disaster that occurs
when a “large numbers of people die quickly because they
have not had enough food to eat.” In these circumstances
some people “die from actual starvation—acute wasting—
and others die from diseases that attack them in their
wasted state” (Parfitt, 2002: 46).  The concept of famine
has been explained and re-defined through history. The
famous examples of famine are the great famine in Eu-
rope in 1315-1317, “a combination of warfare, crop fail-
ures and epidemics reduced the population by two-thirds”
in France during Hundred Years War, and the crop failure
due to potato disease in 1845-1849 in Ireland had killed
about one million people (Parfitt, 2002: 46-47).  The more
recent examples in 20th century are the “Bengali famine
of 1943, the Leningrad famine of 1941–44, the Chinese
Great Leap Forward famine of 1959–61” (Parfitt, 2002:
47).
Devereux argues that there is a chronological ‘intellec-
tual progression’ about the way we think about a famine.
He divided the debate into two major categories and called
them ‘old famine’ and ‘new famine.’ This progression in-
cluded two major shifts: (1) “from famines as failures of
food availability, to failures of access to food” and (2) more
recent shift of the discourse toward the “failures of account-
ability and response” (Devereux, 2007: 9). Malthusian
(Malthus, 1798) approaches classified famines as ‘acts of
God’ occurred as natural disasters, resource scarcities, and
population growth. However, the contemporary notion of
famine and its causes are leaning towards the “‘acts of man’
(they are caused by human action or inaction)” (Devereux,
2007: 11). Even economic aspects of Amartya Sen’s ‘en-
titlement approach’ (Sen, 1981) to hardship identify fac-
tors such as poverty and market failure as essential to un-
derstanding the causes of some famine cases. In contem-
porary times, famines could still be foreseeable and avoid-
able unless there is a failure of ‘public transfers.’ The ‘new
famine’ notion is considered “political because they are
almost always preventable” (Devereux, 2007: 11).
Thus, the primary question of this paper is, how has
the definition and understanding of ‘famine’ changed?
 And the secondary question is, what was the impact of
this understanding on food politics and historical revision-
ism of 1930s famine in Kazakhstan? This paper approaches
famine as a complex biopolitical concept. The understand-
ing and definition of ‘famine’ has changed from (1) the
notion of ‘lack of food’ caused by the growing population
and limited natural resources, to which the policy-making
system and market can only react, to (2) the notion of the
political tool for the management of populations through
threats and deliberately-induced mass hunger. Correspond-
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ingly, the concept of food has also shifted from (1) the
idea of a commodity to be maximized in production and
to be given full distribution by state and private sector
mechanisms to (2) the idea of a resource which may be
manipulated by persons in authority to satisfy other politi-
cal agendas, which may or may not be directly related to
nutritional well-being of the population.
The first part of the paper will provide the literature
review and critical reflections of ‘old famine’ and ‘new
famine’ using biopolitical perspective; and the second part
of the paper will examine the case of the Soviet famine in
Kazakhstan. This paper will use the illustrative case analy-
sis in order to understand and explain the famine from
different conceptual perspectives. The case analysis will
include the literature review and the archival research of
historic documents during the period of 1920s and 1930s
to assist in the attempt of social constructivism of the fam-
ine concept.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
THEORIES OF ‘OLD FAMINE’ AND ‘NEW FAMINE’
Among the theories explaining the ‘old famine’ con-
cept, the most prominent are Malthusianism and the ‘en-
titlement approach’ (Devereux, 2007). Malthusianism de-
scribes famine as a consequence of two simultaneous
events: (1) natural resource usage and food production
growth in arithmetic progression and (2) population growth
in geometric progression. The result is lack of food for
large populations. This explanation has been recently re-
visited by environmental determinism and neo-Malthusi-
anism  (Willis, 2005) that emphases the natural resource
shortage, environmental degradation, limits for industrial
growth, and unsustainable development. In contrast, the
‘entitlement approach’ have directed the discussions to-
wards the economic issues of underdevelopment, poverty,
market failures, and food production (Sen, 1981). Thus,
in spite of Devereux’s ‘old famine’ tag, both theories can
be useful to discuss the contemporary ecological, demo-
graphic, and economic characteristics of famine.
Malthusianism and Entitlement Approach
One of the oldest and most famous explanations of
famine was written by the English priest Thomas Malthus
in the Essay on the Principle of Population published in 1798.
Thomas Malthus argued that famine will occur “to regu-
late population growth and balance the demand for food
with food supplies human populations” (Devereux, 2007:
5-6). In other words, the population cannot grow indefi-
nitely and have a comfortable life due to the limited natu-
ral resources on the Earth. Thus, Thomas Malthus ex-
plained food scarcity using the two propositions about
population and natural resources: first, that food is neces-
sary for human existence and, second, population growth
may exceed the resources necessary to support human
populations (Malthus, 1798). For “every generation, food
supply increases the same amount” that leads to the linear
pattern of arithmetic growth. However, the population will
grow in geometric progression “because in each genera-
tion there will be more people to have children” (Willis,
2005: 146-147). This ‘mainstreamed’ concept of famine
(Devereux, 2007: 2) has influenced the technical/techno-
logical solutions to food crisis, such as the Green Revolu-
tion in the Philippines, Mexico, and India, the Virgin Land
Campaign in the Soviet Union, and the UN projects on
population control in the Global South. Moreover, this
concept of famine and its political acceptance by the main-
stream public policy has improved the funding and preva-
lence of highly politicized biotechnological and genetic
engineering approaches to solutions for food crisis.
Malthus has been criticized particularly for his assump-
tion about the growth of food production. The context of
18th century England shows that he wrote his essay dur-
ing the early stages of industrial revolution. Malthusian-
ism was dependent on the conditions in pre-industrial
agricultural England, which were “defined by the harvests
and the seasons, and ruled by small political and social
elite” (BBC History On-line, 2013). During the 19th cen-
tury, the life in Britain dramatically changed due to tech-
nological inventions. For example, the invention of steam
engine “farm workers made redundant” and caused them
to migrate to towns and cities for work in the factories and
fast-growing manufacturing (Robinson, 2011). Overall, the
industrial revolution brought a massive productivity
growth, which included agricultural production. Conse-
quently in the next two hundred years there would be new
technologies, agricultural methods, legislation, and public
policies that had been developed for food production to
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prevent and mitigate the food crises.  Nevertheless, “just
because sufficient food is produced to feed a population
does not mean that everyone has access to this food” (Willis,
2005: 147-148).
In 1981, poverty and famines introduced the notion of
‘entitlement to food’. Sen proved through his research of
1974 famine in Bangladesh that famine can occur without
food shortage or harvest failures. Even though the harvest
might be officially satisfactory on the national and regional
level, some individuals and households might not be able
to source the food. Famine might happen because of the
‘exchange entitlement decline’ among vulnerable groups
in the society (Sen, 1981).  The cases of famine in
Bangladesh in 1974 and Great Bengal Famine in 1943
showed that “inflation caused by expectations of harvest
failure made food unaffordable for market-dependent land-
less labourers, because wealthy people and traders hoarded
rice in anticipation of a shortage.” This speculation and
inflation-induced famine resulted in 1.5 million deaths in
spite of the availability of food on the national level
(Devereux, 2007: 5-6).
Sen identified the main factors that determine a
person’s capacity for ‘exchange entitlement’ during pos-
sible famine: (1) if a person can find a job; (2) what a per-
son can earn by selling his non-labour assets, and what
food is possible to buy for the amount received from sale;
(3) if a person is capable of producing food or related goods
(for which food is exchangeable) with his/her own labour
power and resources; (4)  the cost of purchasing resources
and the value of the products a person can sell; (5) the
social security benefits a person is legally entitled to and
taxes a person must pay (Sen, 1981: 3).
The entitlement approach provides a “general frame-
work for analysing famines” with an emphasis on food cri-
sis that occurs on the household levels during positive eco-
nomic trends on the national and regional level. And most
importantly, this framework of analysis provides a concep-
tual difference between the “decline of food availability
and that of direct entitlement to food.” The direct entitle-
ment is focused on the identification of vulnerable house-
holds or individuals in the society that maybe at risk of
starvation due to the combination of depressing market
forces and limited/no support by the public social secu-
rity system. Thus, the ‘entitlement approach emphasizes
the rights of vulnerable population during the time of lo-
calized food crisis. Moreover some market forces can only
be activated and permitted “through a system of legal rela-
tions (ownership rights, contractual obligations, legal ex-
changes, etc.).” Hence, the law and governance system
mediates between food availability and food entitlement
(Sen, 1981: 159-162).
When Sen wrote about the famine “most theorists were
preoccupied with explaining failures of food supply” and
used Malthusian assumptions, which required technical
solutions to famine (Devereux, 2007: 9). Thus, this work
of Sen was an academic breakthrough for the new ‘devel-
opment economics’ discourse of famine concept. The criti-
cism of ‘entitlement approach’ to explain famines is lim-
ited by the assumption that government system and re-
gime is to resolve the food crisis, where market failure and
consequent ‘negative externalities’ can be internalized
through  government intervention and laws/regulations.
However, the famines that were “triggered by catastrophic
government policies or failures of the humanitarian re-
lief” and often happen in fragile or failed states are be-
yond the scope of ‘entitlement approach’ explanation. The
entitlement approach fundamentally emphasises the de-
velopment/welfare economic analysis of famine as a de-
pendent variable of entitlement failure such as “lack of
purchasing power” or failures of markets (Devereux, 2007:
10). This approach directed the studies of famines preven-
tion and resolution towards development economics,
which analysed the disruption of the food market in terms
of the ‘supply failure’ or ‘demand failure’ (Devereux, 2007).
It has also influenced the mainstream international devel-
opment initiatives for the improvement of transportation,
communications infrastructure for rural communities, and
peripheral regions, as well as government regulations and
response mechanism to food crisis.
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) uses this
approach for risk management among vulnerable individu-
als and households to starvation during food crises in de-
veloping countries. The UNDP ‘human security’ includes
the legitimate concerns of ordinary people, such as starva-
tion, disease, and repressions, as well as other sudden and
damaging disruptions of daily life. This expanded defini-
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tion includes seven categories of disruption of human se-
curity: economy, food, health, environment, personal safety,
community, and politics (UNDP, 1994). The main criti-
cism of this was that the vast scope of categories, includ-
ing ‘food security’ (rather than ‘famine’) may include al-
most “any kind of unexpected or irregular discomfort could
conceivably constitute a threat to one’s human security”
(Paris, 2001: 89). Despite its limitations, ‘human security’
institutionalized ‘food security’ as part of its definition.
Thus, the multi-dimensional aspect of ‘food security’ has
been particularly influenced by the theory and practice of
development studies (Shaw, 2007).
‘New Famine’
The ‘new famine’ concept has come from the school of
thought that could also be called ‘critical development stud-
ies.’ The main criticism of the school was directed towards
liberal institutionalist and realist explanations of the fail-
ure of peace, development, human security, and other ini-
tiatives of international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and governments. In the post-World War II
period institutional liberals accepted that the occurrence
of market failure results in uneven development, poverty,
and environmental degradation. In order to prevent the
possible crisis and state failure mostly in the developing
countries there should be “some outside involvement… to
supplement the market” (Cohn, 2008: 71). This outside
involvement is usually in the form of international institu-
tions. The ‘institutions’ can correspond to international
organizations such as UNDP, the United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA), UN Food and Agriculture (FAO), and World
Bank, international NGOs such as Red Cross and Oxfam,
or to international regimes often associated with these
organizations (Cohn, 2008). On the one hand, liberal in-
stitutionalist critique had questioned the realist assump-
tion of the centrality of states, national interests, military,
and economic development rather proposing the interna-
tional institutional setting for cooperation.
Thr critical development studies questioned the hid-
den assumptions and benefits of the donor countries poli-
cies with their own national interests. Therefore, the ‘new
famine’ concept has been increasingly focused on the poli-
tics of famine prevention and response to food crisis by
governments and international organizations. The empha-
ses of the studies have been particularly on “building ac-
countability through democratization, the development of
‘social contracts’ between governments and citizens, and
strengthening the ‘right to food’ in international law, in-
cluding the criminalization of famine” (Devereux, 2007:
2). There are two main characteristics that are unique about
‘new famine’ thinking: (1) an emphasis on the political
analysis “as central to explanations of famine causation”
and (2) a methodical emphasis on the accountability fail-
ures “to prevent famine, rather than on the triggers of food
shortage or disrupted access to food” (Devereux, 2007: 7).
There are three contemporary authors - Mark Duffield
(Duffield, 2007), David Keen (Keen, 2008), Alex de Waal
(de Waal, 1997) - who provided the major criticism of the
‘old’ famine’ notions, as well as the international response
to government failure according to the mainstream liberal
institutionalist discourse of the humanitarian assistance,
development, aid politics, and human security. They are
often called ‘complex emergencies theorists,’ who devel-
oped an alternative way to analyze and explain the vulner-
ability of people to famine. The main propositions of this
framework are that all disasters have winners and losers,
and that famine results from the conscious exercise of
power in pursuit of gain or advantage (Devereux, 2007).
All three ‘complex emergency’ theorists use biopolitics of
Foucault to explain the limitations of neo-liberal practice
of governments, international organizations and NGOs
particularly during the humanitarian disasters, such as fam-
ine.
Duffield discusses the concept of biopolitics in the con-
text of fragile and failed states (Duffield, 2007). He distin-
guishes life in the developed and undeveloped worlds as
‘insured’ and ‘uninsured,’ which is protected by govern-
ment or ‘exposed by it.’ The nature and implication of
this biopolitical relationship between states, territories, and
populations has been neglected by mainstream academe.
He argues that, since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, different groups, communities, and peoples were
made to change their economic and social systems in or-
der “to support and promote collective life.” This brought
a biopolitical hierarchy between ‘developed’ and ‘under-
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developed’ species-life that is determined not only by the
wealth but by the welfare governance mechanisms of sup-
port for the ‘survival’ of particular population.
For Foucault (2008), the biopolitics is about the trans-
formation from the classical age to the modern age where
‘modern life’ with its systems is discovered and governed.
In the beginning of the seventeenth century, there were
two major types of powers: (1) an authoritarian ‘sovereign
power’ of kings and queens that allows and disallows life
and (2) a ‘disciplinary power’ that trains ‘human-as-ma-
chine’ through establishment of institutions for medicine,
education, military, and prisons. However from the middle
of the eighteenth century there is a new type of power that
unleashed on human life – (3) ‘biopower,’ which norma-
tively regulates and improves biological and physiological
characteristics of ‘human bodies’ from birth to death on
the collective level of population. The biopower expresses
itself through institutions of health, sanitation, hygiene,
education, and other institutions of population surveil-
lance, safety, and overall security allowing, improving and
“managing life rather than threatening to take it away”
(Taylor, 2011: 41-54).
The arrival of modernity with its technologies, indus-
tries, and factory-models had given political powers to ‘civi-
lize,’ ‘discipline,’ and ‘improve’ those human beings left
‘behind’ in the inefficient traditional lifestyles. Therefore,
the biopolitics and its governmentality is about the “pro-
motion of the productivity and potentiality of species life”
as whole that is “susceptible to historical transformations”
in particular geographic locations in order to regulate and
administer the life of population to the necessities of
‘biopolitical economy of security’ (Drillon & Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008: 270-271, 273). Thus, Duffield depicts the
‘complex malfunctioning’ of fragile or failed states that
expressed in humanitarian disasters. He argues that the
‘life-form’ in developed world, particularly in Europe, is
different from life of people in underdeveloped world by
“the degree to which life is supported by a comprehensive
mixture of remedial and supportive measures, including
public and private insurance-based safety nets, that cover
birth, education, employment, health, and pensions”
 (Duffield, 2007: 5-6).
The life of people is consistently managed by the state
through the provision of social welfare system to protect
the vulnerable or marginalized population.  Hence, the
effective modern states are assumed to be progressively
expanding the knowledge and ability to support life of
population. To realize their population’s optimal produc-
tive potential, a modern state needs to exercise its biopower
by preventing infectious and chronic diseases, by record-
ing the movements of people for their safety, by educating
and disciplining for preventative measures, and by insur-
ing all possible risks that cannot be prevented. Keen how-
ever shows how ‘famine’ can be used as a mechanism for
political, military, and economic gain of the government
or particular rebel/political groups during protracted con-
flicts, natural calamities, or other humanitarian disasters.
He argues it is critical to pay attention to the ‘politics of
famine’ in order to understand the complexities of fam-
ine. He uses the example of Ethiopian famine of 1983-
1984, where the government of Ethiopia had officially
stated that the causes of famine were drought, environ-
mental decline, and overpopulation. However the govern-
ment decision for militias and army to block the humani-
tarian relief for famine to communities that supported rebel
groups had been a crucial factor for humanitarian disaster
(Keen, 2008).
Thus, in this case famine was used as a political and
military measure for counter-insurgency operation. Some
modern famines are therefore were caused by public gov-
ernance failures or collapses. The environmental factors
such as droughts, floods, storms, or political/military fac-
tors such as conflicts can be triggers for the food shortage.
However, it is the failure of appropriate action or conscious
inaction of local, national and international response to
food crisis that allows the food shortage to turn into a
‘famine’ (Devereux, 2007).
Moreover, even though the notion of ‘right to food’
has been part of the international declarations there are
still limits to how much accountability can be enforced.
Thus, the understanding of the ‘new famine’ concept pro-
vides the recognition of ‘famines as a political notion,’
which often influence the marginalized societies within
the state. Famine can become biopolitical when the re-
gime, regulations, and accountability of the authority fail
to prevent or respond to the food crisis rationalizing it as
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biopolitical ‘collateral damage’ necessary for national de-
velopment of the ‘majority.’ Moreover, the biopolitics of
famine becomes international when local, sub-national,
or national welfare safety nets and response mechanisms
are not able or not willing to handle the food crisis, which
escalates it to the involvement of powerful international
multilateral institutions and foreign governments.
RESULT AND ANALYSES
SOVIET FAMINE OF 1931-1933 IN KAZAKHSTAN
Famine was one of the major concerns that the Soviet
system pledged to resolve because food shortage had been
politicized through the very beginning of the USSR cre-
ation (Filtzer, 2010).  Food shortage was an issue in the
World War I, the February and October Revolutions of
1917, and Civil War of 1918-1921. By 1921 the economy of
the new country was nearly completely ruined (Peet &
Hartwick, 2009). To recover the economy, the state initi-
ated industrialization reforms that had to be financed by
the ‘primitive capital accumulation’ from the agrarian sec-
tor of the economy and invested in the greater socialist
modernization drive.
The rural population nonetheless had only partially
supported the industrial agenda and had a limited under-
standing of the government initiatives. In particular, many
herders in Kazakhstan lived nomadic and semi-nomadic
lives and were mostly involved in ‘qoja-related Sufism’ tra-
ditions as well as with the more formalized “mosque-centred
Sunni Islam of the Hanafi madhhab” practices, which were
being introduced by Tatar mullas since 18th century
(Yemelianova, 2014: 288-289).  The “main bearers of
Kazakh Sufi Islam were qojas (Sufi shaykhs) who initially
belonged to those aq suyek (white bone) who claimed their
descent from Muslim saints, from the Four Righteous
Caliphs, or even from the Prophet Muhammad himself.”
The most prominent example of Sufism in Southern
Kazakhstan was “Qoja Ahmad Yasawi (1093–1166), the
founder of the Yasawiyya,” a native of the present day
Turkistan city in Southern Kazakhstan (Yemelianova, 2014:
288).  Traditional Islamic rituals and nomadic traditions
of herdsmen of the Eurasian steppe became part of the
‘Kazakh’ identity for several hundred years and are dis-
tinct from the identities of other Central Asians and Rus-
sians. And “up until the early 1930s, people were not fa-
miliar with the Soviet ideology” and the government plans
for social modernization and industrialization (Nurtazina,
2011: 105). The prosperous middle-class rural population
was formally announced as ‘enemy of the Soviet state’ and
were designated as derogatory ‘Kulak’ class.
The subsequent famine, however, affected not only the
Kulak class, but also the large populations in regions of
Ukraine, Volga, Ural, Siberia, and in Kazakhstan. The
forced economic mobilization and rural collectivization
policies resulted in the disastrous famine of 1931-1933
(Filtzer, 2010: 167-168). Foucault’s discourse on biopolitics
(Foucault, 2008) appears to be appropriate to frame the
biopolitical interaction between the central authorities and
the peripheral regions of Soviet Union. Devereux wrote
that the Soviet famines of the 1920s to the 1940s were
“largely attributable to the malevolent or incompetent ex-
ercise of state power by authoritarian and unaccountable
regimes.” The move to ‘collectivized farming’ included the
appropriation of peasant property, the ban of trade and
other private enterprises, as well as the lack of responsive-
ness “to signals of food crisis.” Ukraine had politicized the
issue of Soviet famine to redefine it as “Stalin’s genocidal
policies against the Ukraine in the 1930s, [where] famine
conditions were deliberately constructed by the state”
(Devereux, 2007: 4). However, other regions of the Soviet
periphery consider this unfortunate period of collectiviza-
tion, peasant rebellion (Viola, 1996) and famine (Ivnitskiy,
2009) as a start of Stalinism as a whole, in which socio-
economic system of repression (Gregory, 2004) and labour
camps (Gregory & Lazarev, 2003) became the norm.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SOVIET FAMINE
In 1929, the 16th Party Congress made a critical deci-
sion “to abandon the New Economic Policy (NEP) for a
never-before-tried feat of social engineering.” The new ini-
tiative was called the Great Breakthrough. This social en-
gineering was about the new Soviet political, social, and
economic system of management that included the “com-
plete state ownership and elimination of private economic
activities” (Hughes, 1991: 1-2). This change marked a start
for the more authoritarian regime, radical economic, and
social policies and highly controversial disciplining mea-
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sures of labour camp system that is now associated with
the notion of Stalinism. In contrast, NEP introduced by
Lenin with the support of Bukharin was characterized by
the mixed economy of private ownership with small and
medium enterprises, while the state still controlled banks,
international trade, and large industries.
If the agricultural production statistics for the period
between 1921 and 1927 are compared to the pre-revolu-
tionary production of 1916, then there is a considerable
improvement in the food production (Figures 1, 2). The
staple foods in the temperate climate are predominantly
wheat for bread production and meat. The wheat produc-
tion drastically fell in 1923 compared to 1916 levels (Fig-
ure 1) due to the Revolution and Civil War. However, from
the start of NEP until 1927 there was a considerable in-
crease in the area for wheat sowing and in sheep produc-
tion (Figures 1, 2). The decision to move to a new eco-
nomic order was the combination of at least three factors
that influenced Stalin: (1) Soviet grain crisis of 1927-1928,
(2) Stalin’s experiences during the trip to Siberia in 1928,
and (3) the Capital Accumulation doctrine that was devel-
oped by Trotsky and later by Preobrazhensky for rapid in-
Figure 1. The Area used for wheat and rye production in 1916 in Russia and in 1923-1927 in the USSR
Source: State Statistica l Publ isher (1930)
Figure 2.  Heads of cattle in the farms of the USSR in 1924-1927 (in thousands of heads)
Source: State Statistica l Publ isher (1930)
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dustrialization.
The grain crisis of 1927-1928 conforms to what may be
called a classic Sen ‘entitlement approach’ crisis. The food
crisis occurred because of the combination of government
regulation on ceiling price, taxation, and the lack of manu-
factured goods while oversupply of agricultural goods in
the market. The emphasis was on the “practice of compul-
sory extraction of agricultural production from the peas-
ants” wherein the government purchases agricultural prod-
ucts such as grain from the peasants at artificially low prices
(Ertz, 2005: 1-14).
On December 1927, the 15th Party Congress intro-
duced the notion of planned economy. The endorsement
of the first five-year plan required the government to accu-
mulate capital for industrialization. In order to lower the
level of government spending for centralized grain procure-
ment, the purchasing price was lowered. The recollection
of hardship conditions similar to this during World War I
resulted in the widespread war scare in late 1927. The war
scare and overall negative expectations about the economy
caused people to hoard food. To protect the rural commu-
nities from further crisis “peasants made the choice to eat
more and sell less” (Viola, 1996: 21-22). Despite good har-
vest and reliable meat production, the outcome was a di-
sastrous underperformance in the national grain procure-
ment. The food crisis was severe in the urbanized indus-
trial centres of the Volga, the Urals, and the Western Sibe-
ria even though the harvest had been excellent in these
areas. This was because wealthier peasants withheld grain
from the market with the expectations that the prices will
rise in the next years (Ivnitskiy, 2009).
However the years following 1928 (see Figure 3) would
only be worse for the staple food. The food crisis of 1927-
1928 was only the beginning of the greater domino-effect
of the complex political emergency. Starting from 1929
there were changes in the agricultural system that affected
the lives of rural populations more than the events of Oc-
tober Revolution of 1917. The crucial factor for the deci-
sion to abandon NEP was Stalin’s tour of Siberia in Janu-
ary 1928. Stalin had toured the Siberian region in “search
of a quick breakthrough in the crisis.” However the overall
experience of this trip had made a “negative effect on his
outlook towards the (Leninist) program of socialism ‘at a
snail’s pace.’” The trip proved essential to validate his sus-
picion that the Kulaks in the periphery were withholding
food supplies from the market in order to sabotage his
regime. The central authorities in Moscow were concerned
about the political aspect of the 1927 ‘entitlement prob-
Figure 3. Average yield for grains (pud/ha)
Source: Ivnitskiy (2009: 68-69)
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lem’ of emergent market failure and increasing inflation
for food. Hence, from the Marxist perspective the class
struggle had been intensifying into possible political pre-
dicament. The livelihood of Siberian rural population was
quite satisfactory: NEP had brought “the growth of peas-
ant income in real terms.” Hence, there was an increased
demand for the industrially manufactured goods among
peasants “adding to peasant income, further depleting
goods stocks and causing a price inflation spiral” for manu-
factured and agricultural goods (Hughes, 1991: 98).
Stalin was not content with the combination of issues
in Siberia. The prosperity of capitalist entrepreneurship
among rural population, the growing real income among
agricultural producers and inflation was disruptive for the
system. Crucially, there was a lack of industrial develop-
ment associated with the workers’ class. To change this
complex trend required a radical reform that could only
be implemented rapidly through enforced conformity to a
centralized collective ‘factory-like’ system of agriculture.
After all, the Revolution and Civil War had been sup-
ported by the industrial factory workers and weary World
War I soldiers, but not by peasants who were the majority
in the wide Steppes and in Siberia. Hence, Stalin realized
that peasants and their life need to be transformed into a
new system of ‘classless society’ with ‘depeasantization’ of
the village (Viola, 1996: 3). Stalin’s tour of Siberia had
proved that the emergency measures to expropriate the
grains and other food from the unruly peasantry were of a
political necessity to maintain a regime and promote in-
dustrialization. As a result, there was an agreement for new
radicalism and “enthusiastic advocacy of the use of emer-
gency coercive measures against peasants” who failed to
conform to the policies. This new radicalism of rapid in-
dustrialization had been named as “the second revolution
of late 1929” in the Soviet Union (Hughes, 1991: 1-2).
Historically, pre-industrial England was able to accumu-
late the large amount of capital quickly by colonization
and gun-boat diplomacy. Therefore, there was a historic
precedent of first successful capitalists, who “accumulated
capital by stealing from weaker elements of society or as
wartime booty” (Gregory, 2004: 29). Thus, Soviet farm-
ers’ agricultural surplus had to be appropriated for invest-
ment into the industry.
Preobrazhensky clearly identified the source of ‘primi-
tive capital accumulation,’ but he failed to explain the trans-
fer mechanism. His solution was that the state monopo-
lized the purchasing of grains with the low ceiling prices
to reduce the peasant income. The state was then to resell
the food at higher prices using the profit to fund industri-
alization (Gregory, 2004). The result was the Great Break-
through policy approved at the 16th Party Congress. The
Five-Year Plan provided the advisory for implementation
called ‘On Grain Procurements’ with the “principle of
compulsory agricultural deliveries” and the “declaration
of war against the more prosperous peasants, the Kulaks”
on January 5, 1930. The policy intention was “liquidat-
ing” the Kulak as a class. This was the start of colossal
industrialization drive of Stalinism through the help of
collectivization, labour camps, and prisons (Gregory &
Lazarev, 2003: 22-23). It was essential not only for the sur-
vival of economic system and political regime, but also for
the emerging modernist Soviet citizenship “as the area
defining Soviet identity” (Clark, 2011: 9).
FAMINE IN KAZAKHSTAN
For hundreds of years, the Kazakhs, a people of Turkic
origin, maintained a traditional livestock-based economy,
a distinct culture, and agricultural practices suited to no-
madic lifestyle on the vast pasture lands of Eurasia. The
ruthless collectivization program imposed by the Soviet
Union on the Kazakh people significantly altered their tra-
ditional lifestyle. There are many personal accounts for
this traumatic social transformation; one of the most popu-
lar is the autobiography Silent Steppe  (Shayakhmetov,
2007). The forced appropriation of livestock and the ag-
gressive ‘cynical campaign’ for continuous collection of
meat from already impoverished herders in the harsh cli-
matic conditions of winter left them with no other op-
tions for sustenance (Nurtazina, 2011). The collectiviza-
tion was implemented by the young urban activists who
had limited knowledge about Kazakh indigenous agricul-
tural practices for livestock production. Collectivization
proceeded nonetheless, and resulted in slaughter of live-
stock, suffering, and death among people whose subsis-
tence depended on livestock-raising (Wilber, 1969). The
revised ‘Soviet way of living’ obligated Kazakhs to contrib-
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ute to the development of the ‘New Lands’ under the col-
lective farms systems, namely ‘kolkhoz’ (collective farm)
and ‘sovkhoz’ (Soviet farm) systems, and promoted the
propaganda of the desirable ‘collective farm worker.’ The
socio-economic systems of the predominantly Islamic no-
mads were regarded as “incompatible with modern mate-
rialism and progress” promoted by the Soviet Union
(Wheeler, 1957). There are no agreed estimates of how
many people died in the famine of 1931-1933 in the So-
viet Union and in Kazakhstan. It is even more difficult to
estimate how many people died directly because of starva-
tion or associated causes such as diseases and political re-
pressions associated with the subversion of Kazakhs to the
Soviet policies.
Zh. Abylkhozhin, M. Kozybaev, and M. Tatimov in their
article published on the pages of the All-Soviet-Union jour-
nal Voprosy istorii in 1989, in which the loss of the Kazakh
population was estimated to be about 2 million people, or
49 percent of the population, and the “direct victims of
hunger,” in their opinion, comprised 1,750,000 people
that made up 42 percent of the Kazakh ethnic group. B.
Tolepbaev and V. Osipov claimed that the number of
Kazakhs who died from starvation was between about
1,050,000 and 1,100,000 people; of other ethnic groups
of the republic, the figure was between 200,000 and
250,000... V. Mikhailov, the author of the documentary
narrative Chronicle of Great Jut in his interview with Ra-
dio Azattyq on December 9, 2008, gave a figure of 40 per-
cent. The latest estimation made by the Kazakh demogra-
pher M. Tatimov was that 2,137,500 Kazakhs died of hun-
ger and disease, and that the number of refugees from
Kazakhstan leaving the country forever was 616,000 people
(about 205,000 people left for China, Afghanistan, and
Iran). Thus, the loss of the indigenous population in
Kazakhstan was 2,635,000 people or 64 percent of the
ethnic group (Nurtazina, 2011: 107-108).
Similarly as in Kazakhstan, there is no agreement of
how many people died in the famine in Ukraine, Russia,
and other parts of the Soviet Union in early 1930s.
Kharkova from the Russian Academy of Science published
a remarkable comparison of evaluation of famine victims
by different authors in the USSR (see Table 1). The list of
authors she included in her research did not agree on the
number of famine victims. There is also no agreement in
the estimates of famine victims in Kazakhstan presented
by Nurtazina (2011) in the passage above.
Demographic data in the Soviet Union of 1930s had
been politicized and most of the openly available informa-
tion at a time was introduced through the formal speeches
of Stalin. The information in the speeches was not consis-
tent and most certainly unreliable. It was only in 1959, six
years after the death of Stalin that the Soviet Union com-
pleted a comprehensive national census and established a
more objective institution for population studies.
Vishnevskiy provided an analysis of Stalin’s speeches that
mentioned demographic data in 1930s. It showed that
there was no consistent, complete, and scientific basis for
the information that was made available on the exact num-
ber of people, mortality, and birth estimates in the state.
Below are the examples of the speeches made by Stalin on
population.
Workers and peasants live here in general not bad,
mortality of population decreased in comparison to the
pre-war period on 26 percent for adults and on 42.5 per-
cent for children, and annual growth of population here
is more than 3 million souls.
What we have for the report period: Population growth
of Soviet Union from 160.5 million people in the end of
1930 to 168 million in the end of 1933. Here everyone
talks that material conditions of labourers have consider-
ably improved, that living became better, happier. This is,
of course, correct. But this leads to the fact that the popu-
Table 1. The evaluation of victims of famine in 1931-
1933 in the USSR
Authors Number of victims, 
in million people 
Lorimer, F., 1946 4,8 
Urlanis, B. 1974 4,8 
Wheatcroft, S.C., 1981 3-4 
Anderson, B. A. and Silver, B.D. ,1985 2-3 
Konkvest, R, 1986 8 
Maksudov, S., 1982 9,8 ± 3 
Tsaplin, V., 1989 3,8 
Andreev, E. et al., 1993 7,3 
Ivnitskiy, N., 1995 7,5 
Source: Kharkova (2003)
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lation began to multiply much faster than in old time.
There are fewer deaths, more fertility, and the net increase
is comparatively more (Vishnevskiy, 2003).
Olcott, who published extensively on politics in
Kazakhstan, used the mortality estimates of Jasny for 1930s,
which show that there were over 1.5 million deaths of
Kazakh people. However there were no specifications about
the causes of these deaths: either by natural causes, or by
starvation or by other causes linked to repressive sanction
under the collectivization program  (Olcott, 1981). Olcott
also estimated that around 80 percent of Kazakh cattle
and sheep herds were destroyed in the collectivization cam-
paign between 1928 and 1932. She had also provided data
on the number of cattle and sheep that she collected from
at least three different sources from late 19th century to
mid 20th century with the gaps in information for some
years. However, it still provided an overall picture for the
tragedy of late 1920s and early 1930s for the predominantly
nomadic economy that was dependent on the livestock
for subsistence (Olcott, 1981). The information on the
cattle and sheep ownership in Kazakhstan with the data
gaps as published by Olcott shows that there was a large
reduction in livestock numbers in 1933 comparatively to
1929 (Figure 4). The livestock production of traditionally
nomadic population had not increased through all 1930s
(Figure 4).
This trend was most certainly linked to the famine and
the restrictions that were implemented by the policies of
collectivization. People’s Commissariat of Agriculture re-
port in 1935 showed a reduction in the number of horses
in Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR),
as well as in Western Siberia, Sverdlovskaya oblast (the
Urals), Saratovski krai and Stalingradskiy krai (the Volga
region). People of Kazakh ASSR and the neighbouring
regions of the Urals, the Volga, and Western Siberia his-
torically (former area of Tatar-Mongol ‘Golden Horde’)
placed an enormous emphasis for traditional horse breed-
ing. The drastic reduction of horses in the households
meant the economic decline and crisis in the society.
The same report states that “the enormous losses of
horses in the farms are caused by sharp class struggle in
the period of the socialist reconstruction of agriculture.
The Kulak top of the village destroyed not only its own
livestock, but also it harmfully encouraged individual peas-
ant farmers by its counterrevolutionary agitation for de-
struction” (People’s Commissariat of Agriculture of the
USSR, 1935). However it is doubtful that local people who
traditionally valued horses as a symbol of prosperity would
consciously destroy them and encourage other peasants to
do the same. Most probably, the reduction was caused by
famine. The reason for this ‘counterrevolutionary agita-
tion,’ ‘sabotage’ and the destruction of traditionally val-
ued horses was not only famine, but also the collectiviza-
tion campaign.
For peasants in Kazakhstan the policy of collectiviza-
tion included the introduction of four different types of
collective farms: (1) Communes was an entirely commu-
nal collective farm with all land, animals, and capital owned
Figure 4. Number of cattle and sheep in Kazakhstan
Source: Olcott (1981)
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by the farm commune, which did not allow any individual
private ownership. (2) Artel was the system when the prin-
ciple land, animals, and capital were under the control of
the collective farm, but the families and households were
allowed to have a small private plot and a few animals for
personal use. (3) TOZ or Partnership for the public land
work was a society for the collective land cultivation, but
private ownership of livestock by households was permit-
ted (Male, 1971). (4) State farm or Soviet farm or Sovkhoz,
was of “limited importance in the collectivization drive in
Kazakhstan and in spring 1930 there were only sixty-two
sovkhoz in the whole of the republic, and most were in
Russian populated regions” (Olcott, 1981: 122). Those
farmers who resisted these categories of collective farms
were considered ‘enemies of State.’ Furthermore, the farm-
ers who had to surrender their agricultural produce to the
State could only exchange it for the manufactured con-
sumer goods that were not vital during the time of fam-
ine.
According to the telegram of Goloshchekin, a Secre-
tary of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party
of Kazakhstan to Stalin in October 1932, “…the regional
commodity fund for the grain appropriation comprised
mainly of the unmarketable goods. Predominantly, there
are the summer raincoats, children’s shoes, varnished lady’s
shoes, men’s shirts, silk ties.” Moreover, in the
Akkermirskiy and Nurinskiy regions of Kazakhstan there
were “8 boxes of plates, 4 boxes of ash trays, cotton balls,
face powder” and other consumer goods that were avail-
able by state provision for farmers in exchange for meat
and grains in the time of starvation. The telegram explains
that these goods were coming from Moscow in exchange
for the grain and meat procurements for the Soviet capi-
tal. However Goloshchekin complained that “goods lie in
the storages” but farmers who surrendered the grain and
meat rejected these consumer goods (Ministry of Internal
Affairs, 2012: 205).
The other telegram to Stalin showed the difficulties
with the collectivization reforms in the Southern
Kazakhstan and required the permission for the use of
repressive measures to settled population with exceptions
for the nomadic or semi-nomadic people. There was a dis-
agreement in the regional committees about “methods and
repressive measures” used for nomadic population that was
“analogous to the accepted [repressive measures] on the
directives in the Kuban regions.” By November 1932 “there
were 19 whole regions and some collective farms in 16
other regions” of Kazakhstan, which were included into
the disciplinary ‘black board’ (Famine in the USSR 1929-
1934, Ministry of Internal Affairs 2012: 218-219, 1932).”
The disciplinary measures included death penalties, arrests,
forced labour, and fines. Stalin replied the next day with
another coded telegram, where he considered that the
evaluation of Comrade Kakhiani on punishing only settled
rural population was “completely incorrect with the given
conditions.” Apparently, Comrade Kakhiani did not con-
sider that in the recent weeks of grain supply in Kazakhstan
“there was irregularly, and this despite the fact that the
plan of grain supply is maximally reduced, but debt ac-
cording to the plan of the procurement is 10 million puds.”
With such conditions there was a need for punishing all
the Communists in the regions, “who are in the captivity
of petty-bourgeois elements and Kulaks who sabotage grain
provisions.” Therefore repressive measures were permit-
ted for the nomadic and semi-nomadic population. Stalin
also added that “of course, the matter cannot be limited
by repressions, since it is also necessary in parallel to pro-
vide the widespread and systematic explanatory work.” In
other words, there was also the need for the appropriate
publicity of the collectivization policy so that rural popula-
tion would be educated into the Soviet ideology and sys-
tem (Famine in the USSR 1929-1934, Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs 2012: 220-221, 1932).
The instructions of Stalin demonstrate that famine was
not merely an incidental consequence of repressive poli-
cies. Mass starvation and hardship were calculated effects
that, technically, were aids to socio-economic redistribu-
tion and reconstruction in areas where moderate policies
would not have brought the desired effects within short
time. In this case, there were no natural disruptions in the
biosphere or purely market forces disruptions, which would
have allowed the use of Malthusian physical/natural or
Sen’s economic constraints as the key factors for explain-
ing famine. The case of Kazakhstan’s famine in the 1930s
are most viably explained by the complex political factors
attributed to the willingness of Stalin and the Soviet gov-
231
ernment to risk the construction of a massive and wholly
unprecedented socio-economic system, regardless of the
cruelty and suffering it entailed on the peripheral popula-
tion. The biopolitics involved the transformation of the
village to a new modernized system of collective agricul-
ture. Those people who rejected the system were punished
by death, labour camps, fines, and other repressive mea-
sures that included famine.
CONCLUSION
There is a clear distinction between (1) the Malthusian
famine related to natural or physical factors (such as popu-
lation growth, environmental disturbances, lack of natu-
ral resources), (2) ‘entitlement’ famine related to socio-eco-
nomic and distributive factors (such as market failure, eco-
nomic, social, or infrastructural obstacles in food supply),
and (3) famine related to complex political factors.
The case analysis of the Soviet famine in 1931-1933
demonstrated that the cause of famine was largely politi-
cal even though there were natural (harsh winter condi-
tions in Kazakhstan) and economic factors (underdevel-
oped infrastructure and government regulation of retail
prices) that further aggravated the food crisis. The food
insecurity was mainly attributed to the incompetent exer-
cise of biopower by the state with the mission to rapidly
industrialize the Soviet economy and society. Also, the re-
gime of Stalin exercised the sovereign power to ‘disallow
life’ and disciplinary power towards peasants who failed
to follow the prescribed policies of collectivization. And
most importantly, there was an apparent lack of respon-
siveness and accountability to resolve the consequent food
crisis that resulted in famine. Moreover, the telegram com-
munication between Stalin and the supervisors of collec-
tivization in Kazakhstan had shown that there was an ap-
proval to use disciplinary repressive measures to those peas-
ants who did not pursue or resisted the collectivization
instructions.
Thus, famine and associated hardship were deliberate
political actions. These actions were necessary in order to
appropriate peasants’ agricultural production by local au-
thorities to generate and accumulate the financial capital
for industrialization drive on the national level. Because
there were no obvious catastrophic natural disturbances
in the biosphere or devastating market forces disruptions
at a time in Kazakhstan, it has not been viable to analyse
the famine of 1931-1933 using Malthusian physical or Sen’s
economic constraints as the key explanatory factors. The
case of Soviet famine in the 1930s in Kazakhstan is most
clearly explained by the complex biopolitical factors of in-
dustrialization and collectivization policies. It was excep-
tional that the Soviet government and leaders on national,
sub-national, and local levels were eager to continue with
the industrialization program to build a new socio-eco-
nomic system in a short period despite the immense suf-
fering that gripped the peripheral rural population.  
Hence, collectivization reforms entailed the visible ex-
ercise of biopower and disciplinary power by the central
and local authorities of the Soviet Union. The biopolitical
dynamics involved the conversion of mostly illiterate peas-
ants and their traditional livelihood to a new modernized
system of collective agriculture. The collectivized agricul-
tural system was intended to eventually improve the stan-
dards of living as well as economic system for the Soviet
‘agricultural workers.’ However, those farmers who dis-
obeyed the new system were punished by death or disci-
plined by labour camps, expropriation of all property, large
fines, and other repressive measures. Thus, the political
controversy included the positive improvement in urban
living conditions and technological development of indus-
trialization on one hand, and the horrendous deteriora-
tion of agrarian production and suffering of peasants in
the periphery regions on the other hand. There was a con-
vergence of an inherent biopower of the reforms intro-
duced for the population with the disciplinary power used
for those peasants who resisted the new system. Further-
more, the government continued the modernization not-
withstanding the issues of public accountability, impover-
ishment of rural population, and deliberate development
in ‘key regions’ at the expense of the ‘other regions.’ There-
fore, the Soviet famine of 1931-1933 can be considered as
a complex biopolitical issue of the well-informed leaders,
who nonetheless neglected the ‘minority’ in the periphery
in order to build a new and unprecedented modern sys-
tem according to the agreed government priorities and
plans. This new system would support the welfare of the
‘majority’ population, sustain the country during World
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War II, and provide an ideational or normative power in
the Soviet foreign relations with the rest of ‘struggling pro-
letariat,’ at the cost of the nearly-forgotten suffering of the
Kazakhs just decades before.
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